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ABSTRACT
It has recently become possible to study the dynamics of information diffusion in techno-social systems at
scale, due to the emergence of online platforms, such as Twitter, with millions of users. One question that
systematically recurs is whether information spreads according to simple or complex dynamics: does each
exposure to a piece of information have an independent probability of a user adopting it (simple contagion),
or does this probability depend instead on the number of sources of exposure, increasing above some
threshold (complex contagion)? Most studies to date are observational and, therefore, unable to disentangle
the effects of confounding factors such as social reinforcement, homophily, limited attention, or network
community structure. Here we describe a novel controlled experiment that we performed on Twitter using
‘social bots’ deployed to carry out coordinated attempts at spreading information. We propose two Bayesian
statistical models describing simple and complex contagion dynamics, and test the competing hypotheses.
We provide experimental evidence that the complex contagion model describes the observed information
diffusion behavior more accurately than simple contagion. Future applications of our results include more
effective defenses against malicious propaganda campaigns on social media, improved marketing and
advertisement strategies, and design of effective network intervention techniques.
Introduction
The diffusion of information and ideas in complex social systems has fascinated the research community
for decades1. The first proposal to use epidemiological models for the analysis of the spreading of ideas
was put forth more than fifty years ago2. Such models, where each exposure results in the same adoption
probability, are referred to as simple contagion models.
It was subsequently suggested, however, that more complex effects might come into play when consider-
ing the spread of ideas rather than diseases. For example, some people tend to stop sharing information
they consider “old news”, while others refuse to engage in discussions or sharing certain opinions they do
not agree with3–5. Such models, in which adoption probabilities instead depend strongly on the number of
adopters in a person’s social vicinity in a way where exposure attempts cannot be viewed as independent,
are referred to as complex contagion6 models. Concretely, we use a threshold complex contagion model, in
which the adoption probability is assumed to increase slowly for low number of unique exposure sources,
then increase relatively quickly when the number of sources approaches some threshold level (see ‘Models’
for full details).
The role of contagion in the spreading of information and behaviors in (techno-)social networks is
now widely studied in computational social science7–19, with applications ranging from public health20 to
national security21. The vast majority of these studies are, however, either observational, and therefore prone
to biases introduced by confounding factors (network effects, cognitive limits, etc.), or entail controlled
experiments conducted only on small populations of a few dozens individuals6, 7. To date, these limitations
have prevented the research community from drawing a conclusive answer as to the role of simple and
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complex information contagion dynamics at scale.
In this paper we shed new light on the nature of information diffusion using a large-scale experiment on
Twitter, in which we study the spreading of hashtags within a controlled environment. Creating a controlled
environment for experiments within online platforms is especially challenging for researchers that do not
have access to the system’s design itself, as traditional techniques such as A/B testing cannot be employed.
Even for service providers like Facebook, ethical concerns emerged when random control trials were carried
out without review board approval15.
For this experiment, we leveraged algorithm-driven Twitter accounts (social bots)22. We had previously
shown that a coordinated network of Twitter bots can be effective in influencing trending topics on Twitter23.
This study is a follow-up experiment designed to quantitatively investigate how users react to information
stimuli presented by single or multiple sources. In particular, for this experiment, teams of students from
the Technical University of Denmark (DTU) worked together to create a network of Twitter bots (a botnet)
designed to attract a large number of human followers. We programmed the bots to spread Twitter hashtags
(see Table 1) in a synchronized manner among a set of real Twitter users from a selected geographical area.
A large number of users in our target dataset followed one or multiple bots (See Figure 1B), which allowed
us to study the effect of multiple exposures from distinct sources on information contagion.
The decision to use Twitter bots to perform coordinated interventions has several advantages: first, we
are able to ensure that the hashtags we introduce are new to Twitter, and therefore that they are seen by the
target users for the first time when we perform experiments. Second, it enables the bots to work together
to expose users to each intervention multiple times. Finally, the Twitter botnet mitigates the confounding
effects of homophily24–26. For example, when conducting a purely observational study, it is a fundamental
problem to distinguish whether a user is more likely to adopt information shared by many of their friends
because they are influenced by their friends sharing the content, or simply because friends tend to be similar,
so anything tweeted shared by the user’s friends is more likely to be of interest to the user.
In the remainder of the paper we will discuss the experimental framework design in detail, then present
two statistical models for simple and complex contagion, developed in order to evaluate the two competing
hypotheses, and finally show the results of the experimental evaluation.
Results
Deploying the botnet. Creating a botnet with a large number of followers with a network structure suited
for testing our hypotheses presented several challenges which are described below.
We began by ensuring that the bots would appear to be human-like if subjected to a cursory inspection.
We achieved this goal by having the bots generate content using simple natural language processing rules as
well as ‘recycling’ popular content from other Twitter users. We also had the bots tweet at irregular intervals,
but with frequencies set according to a circadian pattern. Finally, we used some Twitter users’ tendency to
reciprocate friendships to ensure that the bots were followed by a large number of accounts while themselves
following only a few; a following/follower ratio much smaller than one is unusual in typical twitter bots.
The full botnet consisted of 39 algorithmically driven Twitter accounts. See ‘Materials and Methods’ for
full details on botnet-creation.
Once we had established the botnet, we focused on establishing a network structure that would allow
for investigating the mechanism driving contagion processes. Our strategy was simple: Whenever a user
followed one of our bots, the ID of this user was automatically communicated to the remaining bots, which
then also attempted to get that user to follow them. This strategy resulted in a botnet followed by a large
number of human users (around 25 000 total followers a the time of interventions), in which a large users
followed multiple bots, allowing us to test the effects of multiple exposures to information. Figure 1A
shows the total number of followers as a function of time, while Figure 1B displays the distribution of
users following n bots. Having obtained a botnet with a large number of followers and a desirable network
structure, the bots performed a series of coordinated interventions, described in the following.
The general intervention strategy implemented by the bots follows:
1. Each bot tweets 2 original tweets about a given #hashtag;
2. Each bot retweets the first 4 tweets about that #hashtag;
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Figure 1. Illustration of the status of our botnet at the time of the interventions. The bots had accumulated
a large number (∼25000) of followers (A) at the time of the interventions (shaded region), and many of the
target users followed several distinct bots (B).
Table 1. List of interventions
Hashtag Message
#getyourflushot Encouraging Twitter users to vaccinate.
#highfiveastranger Encouraging users to engage in positive human interactions.
#somethinggood Sharing a recent positive experience.
#HowManyPushups Encouraging healthy behaviors and fitness.
#turkeyface Photoshopping a celebrity’s face onto a turkey.
#SFThanks Hashtag for Thanksgiving in San Fransisco.
#blackfridaystories Sharing Black Friday shopping stories.
#BanksySF Rumor that Banksy, the street artist, was in San Fransisco.
3. Each bot retweets 15 tweets containing that #hashtag that do not originate from other bots;
4. Each bot favorites all tweets about the given #hashtag.
Step 1 of this protocol was based on human-generated tweets; this allowed students to create content
designed to increased the likelihood of adoption. Steps 2–4 were instead automated. By retweeting each
other’s content, the bots provided a higher exposure to the target users with respect to what would have been
possible if bots could only have targeted their mutual friends, as illustrated in Figure 2. An overview of the
hashtags that we introduced is shown in Table 1. The hashtags we introduced support positive behaviors
(e.g., encouraging vaccinations or positive human interactions, sharing something good, etc.) and in some
cases are contextualized with the time period of the intervention (e.g., fostering stories about Thanksgiving
and Black Friday).
To track exposures and contagions, each bot automatically recorded when a target user retweeted
intervention-related content, and also each exposure that had taken place prior to the retweeting. It is
important to remark that users cannot be expected to consume the entirety of content generated by those they
follow: the probability of seeing a tweet can depend on many factors including the total number of accounts
a user follows, the activity level of each of those accounts, and the amount of time that user spends on
Twitter. The two contagion models we created, described in the following, model this uncertainty explicitly.
Models
In the following, we propose two contagion models, namely simple contagion model (SC), in which all
exposure attempts are considered to be independent, and complex contagion threshold model (CC), and
derive quantitative predictions for them. Both models take into account the uncertainty regarding the target
users observing a given tweet. Specifically, we do not have direct access to a user’s actual exposures, to
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Figure 2. Bots in a botnet can work together to provide users with multiple exposures to an intervention.
(A) user U only follows bot B1. Bot (B1) acts as a proxy and exposes the user not only to its own content,
but also to content from two other bots (B2 and B3), that the user does not follow. (B) Twitter feed from the
perspective of user U .
an intervention, but only to the attempted exposures, N. The simple contagion model employs only the
total number of attempted exposures, which we denote k. The complex contagion model, however, is
only concerned with the number of unique sources κ from which one or more exposures have succeeded.
This is because a central idea in threshold models is the reluctance to partake in activities until a number
of individuals in one’s social group have already done so3. To avoid cluttered notation, we write k and
‘number of exposures’ in descriptions relevant for both models, although these should be replaced with κ
and ‘number of unique exposure sources’ for the CC case.
Going forward, we separate the two factors that enter into a users tendency to adopt a behavior. Firstly,
the probability of the user experiencing k exposures, and, secondly, the probability P(RT|k) of the user
deciding to retweet content after experiencing k exposures. Thus, we model the probability of a user
retweeting content from an intervention, given bot activity A as
P(RT|A) =∑
k
P(k|A)P(RT|k). (1)
In the following, A= [a1,a2, . . .] denotes a list of the number of times a user has received attempted exposures
from each bot (disregarding those with zero attempts). For example, A = [2,1,3,1] means that a given user
has been subjected to 2 attempted exposure from one bot, 3 from another bot, and 1 from two bots. In the
case of SC, where only the total number of exposures is of interest, we will use N = ∑i ai to denote the total
number of attempted exposures.
Simple Contagion. We model the number of exposures by assuming that a user sees a given tweet with
some independent probability q. Thus, the number of actual exposures follows a binomial distribution
B(k;N,q) given by q and the number of attempted exposures N,
P(k|N,q) =
(
N
k
)
qk(1−q)N−k = N!
k!(N− k)!q
k(1−q)N−k. (2)
In SC, each actual exposure has some probability ρ of ‘infecting’ the user, which is independent of other
exposures. Hence the probability for an infection after k exposures is simply
P(RT|k)SC = 1− (1−ρ)k, (3)
which is almost linear in k for small values of ρ . Inserting this expression into equation (1) we get
P(RT|N)SC =
N
∑
k=0
N!
k!(N− k)!q
k(1−q)N−k(1− (1−ρ)k), (4)
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which is equivalent to the simpler expression
P(RT|N)SC = 1− (1−ρq)N . (5)
Under results, we fit the parameters in equation (5) to the data obtained by our experiment. Next, we derive
an expression for the retweet probability of the complex contagion model.
Complex Contagion. When quantifying the predictions of CC, we face two obstacles: (i) redefining the
conditional retweet probability P(RT|A) in order to incorporate the threshold effect of CC; and, (ii) obtaining
an expression of the probability distribution for κ given the previous activity A.
Let us first derive the probability distribution for κ given previous activity A. The probability pi of source
i resulting in one or more actual exposures is given by a binomial distribution using similar considerations
as those leading to equation (5):
pi = 1− (1−q)ai . (6)
Hence, the distribution of unique exposures is the result of independent draws from |A| Bernoulli trials
with ai draws from each, with individual success probabilities pi, also known as Poisson’s Binomial27. For
example, the probability of κ = 1 given a list of attempted exposures A is obtained by summing over the
different ways we may achieve success in only a single Bernoulli trials:
P(κ = 1|A) =
|A|
∑
j=1
p j︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− (1−q)a j)∏
i 6= j
1−pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−q)ai . (7)
Generalizing this to any κ ≤ |A|, we sum over every unique combination of κ successful trials. Denoting
the set of sets of κ integers between 1 and |A| by Sκ , we get
P(κ|A) = ∑
s∈Sκ
∏
i∈s
(1− (1−q)ai)∏
i/∈s
(1−q)ai , (8)
Sκ = {s⊆ {1,2, . . . , |A|} , |s|= κ} . (9)
We include a note in the SI on how to efficiently compute equation (8), as this expression becomes infeasible
to compute using a brute force approach when |A| > 25. As in equation (1), we sum over positive κ to
obtain a final expression for the retweet probability given a list A of exposure attempts, by computing the
sum ∑κ P(κ|A)P(RT|κ) over the probabilities given by equation (8).
P(RT|A) =
|A|
∑
κ=1
∑
s∈Sκ
∏
i∈s
(1− (1−q)ai)∏
i/∈s
(1−q)aiP(RT |κ). (10)
Now we select a threshold function for P(RT |κ). We choose a Sigmoid function,
P(RT|κ)CC = ρl + ρh−ρl1+ e−w(κ−κ0) , (11)
as it employs both a threshold κ0, steepness w and the lower and upper limits, ρl and ρh. Sigmoids are
commonly used to model soft thresholds, for example as activation functions in neural networks28, or as
fuzzy membership functions29. Combining (10) and (11), the expression for P(RT|A) becomes
P(RT|A)CC =
|A|
∑
κ=1
∑
s∈Sκ
∏
i∈s
(1− (1−q)ai)∏
i/∈s
(1−q)ai
(
ρl +
ρh−ρl
1+ e−w(κ−κ0)
)
. (12)
Having derived expressions for the retweet probability for a user given previous exposure activity for both
the SC and CC hypotheses, we proceed to fit the models to our experimental data.
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Figure 3. Simple contagion (SC, left) does not adequately describe the contagion dynamics: the best fit
underestimates the probability of retweeting after a low number of exposures and overestimates the
probability with a large number of exposures. The best fit of complex contagion (CC, right) dynamics
correctly estimates the probability of retweeting across the number of sources of exposure. A. Percentage of
tweets that were retweeted after k successful exposures (SC) or after exposures from κ sources (CC). B.
Number of tweets retweeted following k successful exposures (SC), or after exposures from κ sources (CC).
Best fit of SC model (equation 4) and CC model (equation 10) to the data using q = 0.20, plotted up to
k = 7 (and κ = 8) to avoid plotting noisy data for large values of k (and κ).
Analysis. We now use these two contagion models to investigate how the adoption probability P(RT)
varies as a function of the exposure numbers in our dataset. By studying how well each model fits the
observed data, we can determine which model is the most appropriate description of the contagion processes
measured in the experiment.
An example of the distributions for q = 0.2 and the best fits of the SC and CC models are shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 suggests that the SC model from (4) is not an adequate fit to the observed data, whereas the CC
model from (10) provides an excellent fit. The figure indicates that the CC model, which models contagion
as a function of the number of distinct sources provides a better explanation for the user behavior on Twitter.
In order to compare the models in a way that takes into account different model complexities, we use the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score30 on simulations using the probabilities provided by the two
models (see Methods for details). The results, displayed in Figure 4, show that the CC model results in better
BIC scores for any value of q. In general, a difference in BIC scores larger than 10 points is considered
a very strong evidence in support of the model with the lower score31. Figure 4 shows gaps between the
average BIC scores of the two models that are substantially larger than 10 points throughout the entire range
of values of q, supporting the hypothesis that the CC model is the best explanation for the dynamics of
information diffusion on Twitter.
For very small values of q (q < 0.1) the gap between the BIC scores of the two models is small, and as q
grows the gap increases to reach its maximum for values of q around 0.5. The reason for the low BIC scores
in the case of very low values of q is that the estimates of exposure numbers from equations (2) (SC) and
(8) depend on q and yield a very low number of estimated successful exposures for low values of q, which
causes the error bars on the number of estimated retweets (such as those from Figure 3B) to grow large.
Discussion
Diffusion phenomena in social and techno-social systems have attracted much attention due to the importance
of understanding dynamics such as disease propagation, adoption of behaviors, emergence of consensus and
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Figure 4. BIC scores for both SC and CC models for a range of values of q, the lower the score the better.
Across the values of the q parameter, complex contagion model achieves lower BIC scores than simple
contagion. The thick lines are the mean values of the simulations, and the shaded regions are the percentiles
corresponding to one standard deviation, i.e. they contain 68% of the simulation results.
influence, and information spreading1, 6–8. In contrast to modeling epidemics, for which clear laws have
been mathematically formulated and empirically validated2, 4, modeling and understanding information
diffusion has proved challenging, in part due to the inability to perform controlled experiments at scale and
due to the abundance of confounding factors that bias observational studies24–26. Two competing hypothesis
have been debated, namely that information spreads according to simple or complex contagion. In this work
we test the two hypotheses by creating a controlled experimental framework on Twitter: we deployed 39
coordinated social bots22 that interacted with a selected cohort of participants (our target population), and
carried out a variety of interventions, in the form of attempts to spread new positive messages (i.e., memes
for social good). The bots recorded the behavior of the target users and all their interactions with the bots
and with other users, while tracking the number of exposures to each message over a period of more than
one month. The data we collected allowed us to test two Bayesian models that we derived to capture the
diffusion dynamics of simple and complex information contagion. Specifically, in our complex contagion
model, we assume that the probability of adoption depends on the number of unique sources of information,
rather than the number of exposures.
The statistical evidence clearly shows that the complex contagion model is a better explanation for the
observed data than the simple contagion model. This imples that exposures from multiple sources impacts
the probability of spreading a given piece of information. This threshold mechanism differs significantly
from, say, the spreading of a virus, where many exposures from a single source are sufficient to increase
probability of infection. A variety of explanations for the complex contagion hypothesis have been proposed
in social theory, including social reinforcement and social influence, echo chambers, human cognitive limits,
etc.1, 3, 9–11, 13, 19. While our work identifies the type of mechanism according to which information spreads
from person to person, much work is still needed to discriminate which factors drive this phenomenon. We
expect that future work will explore these factors and further disentangle and explain the dynamics of human
communication in social networks.
Methods
Data. All data was collected in accordance with the Danish regulations for personal data; additionally
the study has been subject to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. The IRB grantee is Indiana
University (protocol number 1410501891), which was the hosting institution of the only U.S.-based author
(Emilio Ferrara) at the time when this experiment was performed. All co-authors aligned to the requirements
imposed by Indiana University’s approved protocol. All data are available from the corresponding author on
request.
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Botnet creation. We designed the Twitter bots as part of a graduate course on social networks. The goal
was to create bots which appear, at a cursory glance, to be human-operated Twitter accounts, but in reality
are algorithmically driven (by means of Python scripts). The bot creation was divided into two phases:
first, the goal was to build convincing accounts that real users might want to follow. Second, we worked to
infiltrate a set of geographically co-located real users and spread new hashtags among them.
In phase 1, each group of 2-4 students manually created 1-3 personas (with interests, music taste,
favorite sports team, etc.) and corresponding Twitter profiles, each with a profile picture, profile description,
background picture, etc., resulting in a total of 39 bots. Each group also manually posted a number of initial
tweets for each bot.
One of the key objectives was to achieve a large follower base while maintaining a low following/follower
ratio. A low following/follower ratio is unusual among bots21 and signals popularity on Twitter. Our bots
achieved a low ratio by capitalizing on the fact that many new users with relatively few followers (and other
Twitter bots) tend to reciprocate the link when they gain a new follower. Therefore, we used the following
strategy: Every day, each bot automatically followed approximately 100-200 randomly selected accounts
with a low follower count or the string ‘followback’ in the description. After 24 hours, the bots unfollowed
the accounts that failed to reciprocate their follow. This routine was repeated every subsequent day. Using
this strategy, the bots were able to maintain a following/follower ratio close to 1, while gaining large amounts
of followers. The bots avoided automatic detection by limiting the churn among their followers, since
performing too many (un)follow operations in a day leads to a suspension of the account. As a whole, the
botnet was successful in gaining a large group of followers which grew steadily throughout the duration of
the experiment, as shown in Figure 1A.
While attracting followers, the bots gradually assumed a number of behaviors designed to emulate
human behavior:
Geographical patterns. All bots’ self-reported location in their Twitter profile was set to the San Francisco
Bay Area. In addition, all bots tweeted with geo-tagged tweets, set to originate from a random location
within the Bay Area bounding box. This allowed our bots to target a geographically-confined region.
Temporal patterns. Bots also timed their tweets to match typical diurnal patterns corresponding to the
pacific time zone, and produce content that reflected circadian patterns of activity commonly observed
online32.
Content. Finally, based on simple natural language processing rules, the bots automated tweeting and
re-tweeting of content that matched the persona developed above.
As final step of phase 1, the bots unfollowed users which were obviously spam/bot accounts in order to
decrease their following/followed ratio. To investigate the quality of each bot, we routinely used the online
service Bot or Not API331 to ensure that the bots appeared human to state-of-the-art bot-detection-software.
In phase 2, the bots began following non-bot Twitter accounts within the target area (San Francisco/Bay
Area), leveraging the information users self-reported in their Twitter profiles (location string). To achieve
the goal of having individuals in the target area following multiple bots, the bots maintained a shared list
of Twitter accounts that followed-back any of the bots – and all bots followed those real accounts over the
following days. As a result, many Twitter users in the target set ended up following multiple bots by the time
when the interventions occurred during the period between November 15th to December 2nd, 2014. The
distribution of the number of bots followed by other Twitter users during the intervention period is shown in
Figure 1B.
Statistics of observed data. The following shows how the observations, including the error bars, in
figure 3 were obtained. For both SC and CC, we investigate how P(RT) changes as a function of k, then
iterate over each of the interventions and for each target user we compute the distribution of exposure
numbers, according to equation (2) for SC, and according to the Poisson binomial distribution shown in
equation (8) for CC. These distributions allow us to estimate the number of retweets after k exposures
in the following way: Consider a series of events S1,S2, . . . ,Sn, each representing a user retweeting an
intervention-related tweet. For an event Si, we have probabilities pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,n of the event representing
1http://truthy.indiana.edu/botornot/
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k = 1,k = 2, . . . ,k = n true exposures. Hence, considering a discrete value k = j, the event can belong to
bin j with a probability pi, j, and it can belong in another bin with probability 1− pi, j; i.e., it is drawn drawn
from a Bernoulli distribution with pi = pi, j and σ2i = pi, j(1− pi, j). Similarly, the following event is drawn
from another Bernoulli distribution independent of the first, and so the distribution of each bin follows
another Poisson binomial distribution with µ = ∑i pi and σ2 = ∑iσ2i . This process approaches the normal
distributionN (µ,σ2), when the number of Bernoulli draws becomes large due to the central limit theorem
(see SI Appendix for details). Thus, can we obtain an approximate distribution for the number of observed
retweets for each value of k.
Bayesian Information Criterion. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) score is defined as
BIC =−2ln(L)+ k ln(n), (13)
where L is the likelihood of the data given the model, k is the number of model parameters, and n is the
number of data points. We compute the likelihood based on the fits to the number of retweets, i.e. fits like
those shown in Figure 3B: For each exposure number k, we have (from our previous analysis) an estimate of
the number of times, Nk, a user has experienced k exposures. To ensure a discrete number of retweets, we run
a series of simulations, computing P(k|A) for each retweeting user and adding 1 to a bin k, which is selected
using that probability distribution. We denote the number of retweets in bin k by nk, and discard bins in
which nk < 5. As our models provide the probability P(RT|k) of each exposure succeeding in eliciting a
response from the exposed user, the likelihood of each bin in one such simulation is given by a binomial
distribution, and the total likelihood is simply the product of those, i.e.
L =∏
k
(
Nk
nk
)
P(RT|k)nk(1−P(RT|k))Nk−nk . (14)
We repeat this simulation 103 times for both SC and CC for the full range of values of q.
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Note on Generating Unique Unordered Subsets
In the following, we outline an efficient method to compute the Poisson binomial distributions over κ for
the complex contagion model. The probability distributions
P(κ|A) = ∑
s∈Sκ
∏
i∈s
(1− (1−q)ai)∏
i/∈s
(1−q)ai , (15)
We observe that while each element of an instance of
Sκ = {s⊆ {1,2, . . . , |A|} , |s|= κ} , (16)
the subsets of an activity list A of size k, give a contribution to P(κ|A), the contribution depends only on the
elements of the set, and not on their order. As the number of these subsets is a combinatorial expression
that grows very quickly with |A| and k, and as the majority of the elements in A were ones (as most of the
bots only participated once in each intervention), we were able to complete the otherwise infeasible exact
computation of P(κ|A) by devising a method to generate unique unordered subsets from A and then multiply
each unique subset with its multiplicity, which could in turn be computed from simple combinatorial
expressions.
To illustrate our approach, we first explain a common way (as implemented in the itertools module
in Python 2.7) of generating all possible subsets of a given length of a set. As an example, we use
A = [2,1,2,1,3,1,1,4] and k = 3. Three pointers are then initialized to the three first values, and the last of
those is set as the ‘active’ pointer. A series of steps is then repeated until none are possible:
• Attempt to move the active pointer one step to the right.
• If the pointer falls off the array or runs into another pointer, then set to active the pointer to the left of
the current one and attempt again.
◦ Terminate if we run out of pointers, i.e. if no pointers can be moved anymore.
• When move is successful, generate the set of the values pointed to, move all pointers to the right of the
active pointer to the positions immediately following it, and reset the ‘active’ status to the rightmost
pointer.
This then generates subsets like (2,1,2), (2,1,1), . . . (2,1,4), (2,2,1), (2,2,3) etc. until (1,1,4) where no
more pointers are able to move and the procedure terminates.
This approach has the disadvantage of recounting subsets that are identical or are permutations of each
other, such as (2,1,2) and (2,2,1) above. We remedy this by adding to the above algorithm a preprocessing
step in which the input list A is sorted, and then defining a new list S in which the i’th element denotes the
position the active pointer should be moved to given that it is pointing to A[i] now, i.e. the value of S[i] is the
value of the first index i′ at which A[i′]> A[i]. Reusing the example above to illustrate this,
S = [4,4,4,4,6,6,7,8],
A = [1,1,1,1,2,2,3,4],
where the final index i = 8 falls off the array, consistent with the description above. This generates subsets
like (1,1,1), (1,1,2), (1,1,3), . . ., (1,2,2), (1,2,3) etc. until (2,3,4). The multiplicity of each such subset
can be computed analytically, allowing one to compute the probability of drawing each subset.
When some elements of A occur very frequently, this approach, which we call the ‘uniqueness’ approach
here as it only counts unique combinations, results in a clear improvement over the brute force approach.
Indeed, for our data this approach turned out necessary to perform an otherwise infeasible computation.
To illustrate this, we ran both method on simulated lists A of varying lengths, constructing each list A by
randomly drawing elements from a distribution representative of our data. The resulting runtimes are shown
in figure 5 and clearly show the speedup.
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Figure 5. Time needed to compute P(κ|A) using a brute force approach (solid red line) and our unique
subset generation approach (dashed blue line). For each data point, we generated a simulated activity list
with length |A| with elements drawn with probabilities based on their frequency in our data, and computed
P(κ|A) using the two methods. The runtime is then averaged over 100 such computations in order to
minimize noise. Our approach allows us to compute Poisson binomial distributions for activity lists of
lengths that would otherwise be infeasible.
Note on the Gaussian approximation of the Poisson Binomial
In the following, we detail why the Poisson binomial distribution consisting of n draws fr om separate
Bernoulli distributions with individual probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn, and accordingly, variances σ2i = pi(1− pi)
approachesN (µ,σ2), where µ = ∑i pi and σ2 = ∑i pi(1− pi) for large n. This closely follows the proof
of the central limit theorem using characteristic functions, but we include the derivation in case some readers
are unfamiliar with the proof.
The characteristic function (c.f.) of a random variable X is defined as
ϕX (t) = 〈eitX 〉=
∞
∑
n=0
in
〈Xn〉
n!
tn, (17)
which results in the properties
ϕX+Y (t) = ϕX (t) ·ϕy(t), (18)
ϕcX (t) = ϕX (ct). (19)
Note that the c.f. for a Gaussian with zero mean,N (0,σ2), is e−σ2t2/2. Rather than considering directly
the random variables Xi drawn from the Poisson binomial, we first subtract from each the mean success
probability, i.e. we transform them like Xi→ Xi− p. This subtraction ensures that 〈Xi〉= 0 and 〈X2i 〉= σ2i ,
which simplifies the proof We also divide by the square root of the number of draws, as this makes the
convergence easier to show. When the derivation is done, we can simply obtain the distribution of the sum
by substituting µ → µ+∑i pi and σ →
√
nσ .
Writing out the c.f. for these random variables using (18) and (19) gives
ϕ∑i Xi/
√
n(t) =
n
∏
i=1
ϕXi/
√
n(t) =
n
∏
i=1
ϕXi(t/
√
n) (20)
Using the properties following from the variables having zero mean, the expansion in (17) becomes
ϕX (t) = 1− σ
2
2
t2+O(t3), (21)
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so we get
ϕ∑i Xi/
√
n(t) =
n
∏
i=1
(
1− σ
2
i
2n
t2+O
(
t3/
√
n3
))
. (22)
Using the expansion of the natural log, ln(1− x) = ∑∞n=1 (−1)n x
n
n =−x+O(x2), this may be rewritten as
ϕ∑i Xi/
√
n(t) = e
ln
(
∏ni=1
(
1− σ
2
i
2n t
2+O
(
t3/
√
n3
)))
, (23)
= e
∑ni=1
(
− σ
2
i
2n t
2+O
(
t3/
√
n3
))
(24)
Noting that ∑ni=1σ2i = n ·σ2, meaning that when the moments of X are bounded, the c.f. approaches
lim
n→∞ϕ∑i Xi/
√
n(t) = e
−σ2t2/2, (25)
which is the c.f. forN (0,σ2), meaning that the distribution goes to 1√
2piσ2
e−x2/2σ2 as previously described,
the distribution for the sum of the original random variables can then be obtained by substituting x→ x−∑i pi
and σ2→ n ·σ2 = ∑i pi(1− pi).
Note on Data Collection
The bots were hosted on Amazon EC2 instances, ensuring uninterrupted operation. Each team collected the
data about their bot’s activity as well as the development of its Twitter network. A script installed by each
team facilitated the data collection effort. Once per hour it queried the Twitter API for the list of friends and
followers of the team’s bot, as well as the content it recently (re)tweeted. The script would then send the
data to the central server at DTU for storage and further analysis. By relegating the collection effort to each
team we avoided the Twitter API call quotas, which would curb the process if we had used a single account
to gather the data.
During the intervention period, another script, installed at the central server, used the Twitter Streaming
API to collect tweets with predefined hashtags coming from all Twitter users. We combine the information
collected by the teams with the record of all interventions-related tweets to analyze the dynamics of
information spread.
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